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Executive Summary

Hillol Bala
Indiana University
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Best practice suggests that a modular enterprise architecture, where interfaces between
and among business processes and services are standardized, is a key IT capability
for firms to achieve profitable growth. But few firms have successfully designed,
implemented, and maintained such an architecture. This article presents findings on the
drivers, constraints, and actions taken by two companies that transitioned to a modular
enterprise architecture in response to competitive pressures from their business partners
or customers. One company implemented an industry standard and the other developed
custom partner interface processes (PIPs) to achieve business modularity. The lessons
from these two case studies show how companies can smoothly transition to a modular
enterprise architecture.

Mark Lewis
Bentley University
(U.S.)

THE INCREASING NEED FOR A MODULAR
ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE

Viswanath Venkatesh
University of Arkansas
(U.S.)

At most companies, IT support for business processes has been cobbled together in
a series of unrelated IT projects. Some projects build application silos; others link
them together. The result is a highly inflexible IT architecture. Most IT and business
executives agree that a more modular architecture—where IT-enabled business
processes are plug-and-play components that can be used to meet changing business
demands—provides far more capability for companies to grow rapidly and profitably.
But inflexible legacy systems and processes are impeding progress in building
modular IT and business capabilities. Firms wanting to move toward a modular
enterprise architecture face a multi-year evolutionary process.2 Building modular
capabilities is a gradual process and is often slowed down by the tendency to invest
in immediate business needs rather than long-term capabilities. As a consequence, few
companies have achieved a modular IT and business environment.

MISQE is
Sponsored by

In the meantime, the need for modular capabilities has been increasing. While many
architecture efforts focused initially on leveraging a firm’s internal resources, many
companies today are focusing on expanding their vertical and horizontal partnerships
and extending operations globally. Thus it is important to understand how a modular
enterprise architecture can enable firms to leverage resources across supply chains and
distribution channels.
Two major technological innovations are helping firms to interface flexibly with
partners:

1 Jeanne Ross is the accepting Senior Editor for this article.
2 See Ross, J. W., Weill, P., and Robertson, D. C. Enterprise Architecture as Strategy: Creating a Foundation
for Business Execution, Harvard Business School Press, 2006, for a description of the stages that most companies
go through as they work toward more modular architectures.
© 2010 University of Minnesota
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Figure 1: Two Companies Moving to a Modular Enterprise Architecture
Delivery Corp.

Electronics Corp.

Industry Positioning

Integrated logistics solution provider

Electronics component manufacturer

Company Size

Large

Medium

Process Standards

Negotiated and proprietary

Public

Key Challenge

Loose coupling among services offered to
customers

Loose coupling with suppliers and
customers

1. Process standards in vertical industries
2. Service-oriented architecture (SOA)
technologies, which have created the tools for
building modularity. In an SOA, functionality
is encapsulated,3 and standardized interfaces
and service levels are exposed.4
This article describes the experiences of two
companies as they transitioned to a modular
enterprise architecture (Appendix A describes our
research methodology). We have been studying these
companies for several years, and we describe their
major drivers for a modular architecture, the key
constraints faced, and the actions taken to overcome
the constraints.
The first company, which we call Delivery Corp.,
provides supply chain services and is a large
subsidiary of one of the global leaders in logistics
and transportation. Its revenues in 2006 were about
$10 billion. The markets for its diversified offerings
are turbulent, and it faces significant and growing
competition. As well as establishing a platform of
standardized technology and optimized business
processes, Delivery Corp. has been developing
proprietary standards to integrate services across
business units and with the business processes
of customers. Delivery Corp. intends to establish
standardized interfaces across complementary services
so as to achieve profitable growth.
The second company, which we call Electronics
Corp., is a small-to-medium enterprise, with
low product diversification. It has transitioned
to a modular enterprise architecture by adopting
RosettaNet’s industry standards for electronic
business-to-business integration. This enterprise
3 Encapsulation is a principle of information systems development
that allows developers to hide the actual implementation (and
associated design decisions) of procedural logic behind a standardized
interface. This interface is made available to clients (e.g., other systems
or interfaces) that need to access and use the procedural logic to
perform a function.
4 See Hirschheim, R., Welke, R., and Schwarz, A. “Service-Oriented
Architecture: Myths, Realities, and a Maturity Model,” MIS Quarterly
Executive (9:1), 2010, pp. 37-48.
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architecture enables loose coupling with suppliers and
customers, and balances efficiency and flexibility in
extended enterprise processes.
These and other contextual differences between
the two firms provide rich contrasts for identifying
practical guidelines for transitioning to a modular
enterprise architecture (see Figure 1). Delivery Corp.
is standardizing interfaces among its complementary
services, while Electronics Corp. is using industryestablished interfaces to coordinate with its suppliers
and customers. In the next sections, we present the
cases of these two companies, discuss their journey
toward business modularity, the constraints they
encountered in this journey, and actions they took
to address these constraints. We conclude with a
discussion of lessons learned from the two cases.

CASE 1: DELIVERY CORP.
Delivery Corp. was established in the early 1990s as
a subsidiary of a global logistics and transportation
leader in response to rapidly growing demand
for supply chain solutions. Its parent company is
positioned in a mature market for transportation
solutions and has a strong culture rooted in sixsigma capabilities for continuous improvement. In
contrast, Delivery Corp. is positioned to operate in an
innovative market for supply chain solutions, where
assumptions of homogeneous customer requirements
are invalid.
In addition to core offerings, such as freightforwarding and customs brokerage, Delivery Corp.
has pursued a differentiation strategy by developing
a wide variety of specialty services, such as service
parts logistics, technical repair and configuration, and
supply chain design and planning.
Delivery Corp. has grown rapidly in the past 15 years
by following a strategy of aggressively acquiring
specialized logistics firms. Although adding to the
overall portfolio of offerings, the early acquisitions
resulted in disparate business units that deployed

© 2010 University of Minnesota
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IT for local improvements and did not coordinate IT
investments. Moreover, in the formative acquisition
years, there were no IT standards to integrate
technology “islands.”
In the 1990s, Delivery Corp. attempted to alleviate
the high costs and risks of its technology islands
with initiatives that defined shared data, platforms
and resources, and integrated applications through
protocol interfaces. These initiatives helped the
firm improve its cost structures by enabling the
integration of applications and processes. As Delivery
Corp.’s CIO explained, “We built standards; we built
enterprise hardware standards, software standards,
architecture standards, security standards, and
implementation standards.” IT management also
established significant discipline to measure costs for
IT projects to assess return on investment.
In 2002–2003, Delivery Corp. moved to optimize
its core business processes. Around this time, in an
effort to streamline processes across business units,
the firm established an enterprise view of data and
applications. This view was a consequence of a
major shift in IT strategy, away from improving local
applications continuously to developing a shared
infrastructure.
One example of a shared capability was the creation
of an enterprise data warehouse that extracted data
from previously disparate transaction systems used by
the business units. By aggregating data from different
business units into a central repository, managers were
able to obtain a comprehensive view of the entire
breadth of services Delivery Corp. was providing to
its customers. The shared capabilities helped the firm
show “one face” to its customers. They also allowed
sales managers to delve into a particular customer
account to see how revenues related to service
offerings, geographic territories, sales personnel, and
other previously segregated entities.
During this time, integrated processes for customer
relationships, sales management, and IT management
were also established.

Drivers of a Modular Enterprise
Architecture
Although data standardization and application
rationalization improved operational efficiencies,
Delivery Corp. continued to evaluate an alternate
operating model that would allow it to meet
differentiated customer needs more profitably. As
the COO of Delivery Corp. explained, “Our goal

© 2010 University of Minnesota

is to combine standardized services efficiently for
customers so that they perceive the solution as
customized.”
To pursue growth in the competitive supply chain
outsourcing industry, Delivery Corp. had to service
customers that required a complex portfolio of
differentiated solutions. These customers were
not profitable for Delivery Corp. as meeting their
requirements required significant IT customization.
The process of integrating services across business
units to meet customer requirements too often resulted
in one-off initiatives with long lead times and high
costs. It was taking between 8 and 12 months to
integrate the processes required to deliver customized
solutions, which harmed customer satisfaction,
pushed up costs, and constrained growth. To address
these performance issues, Delivery Corp. decided to
standardize interfaces and develop “plug-and-play”
capabilities for services offered to customers.
Developing a modular enterprise architecture
became especially important for three reasons.
First, standardized interfaces would help Delivery
Corp. leverage its heterogeneous IT environment
that comprised many interrelated applications for
services—such as brokerage, freight-forwarding,
and warehousing—that together support an endto-end supply chain solution. These applications
were patched together with application program
interfaces (APIs) that enabled data to flow between
them. Second, the standardized interfaces and plugand-play capabilities would help Delivery Corp.
develop efficient collaborative relationships with
customers because it would not have to customize the
integration of processes to meet their requirements.
Finally, a modular enterprise architecture would help
Delivery Corp. thrive in a highly competitive business
environment where low-cost competitors pose
significant challenges.

Constraints Encountered
We identified four key challenges faced by Delivery
Corp. in transitioning to a modular enterprise
architecture:
non-modular
business
services,
incompatible process interfaces, limited executive
knowledge, and short-term decision criteria for IT
investment.
1. Non-Modular Business Services. Delivery
Corp.’s portfolio of capabilities has evolved through
organic growth and external acquisitions, which
made the development of a robust and agile enterprise
architecture especially challenging. The firm faced
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significant challenges as each acquired company,
and in many cases individual functional units within
that company, had legacy systems, including ERP
systems. Because Delivery Corp. grew so rapidly and
had disparate IT systems that lacked standardized
interfaces, developing enterprise solutions that pooled
services across business units proved particularly
challenging.
2. Incompatible Process Interfaces. In an effort
to be responsive to customers in the early years of
its evolution, Delivery Corp. spent large amounts
of money integrating customer processes with its
core operations. As interfaces for services were illdefined, customers asked for unique APIs to integrate
processes and exchange data. For example, they
requested customized interfaces for advanced shipping
notification or tracking the movement of goods across
the supply chain. This IT customization pushed up
costs and hampered the economies of scale needed for
profitability.
3. Limited Executive Knowledge of Enterprise
Architecture. Some of Delivery Corp.’s senior
executives had previously spent several years at
the parent company, which operates in a different
environment than Delivery Corp. As a consequence,
these executives have a limited understanding of the
role of enterprise architecture and do not appreciate
its potential to standardize interfaces and dynamically
integrate processes.
4. Short-Term Decision Criteria for IT Investment.
Net Present Value (NPV) techniques were used to
evaluate IT investment proposals and to prioritize
projects. Given this short-term focus, projects that
contribute to and enhance long-term architecture
capabilities received short shrift. For example, initial
proposals to invest in encapsulating business services
and standardizing their interfaces were not given
the go-ahead, because they could not be justified in
terms of generating revenue from meeting a current
customer’s solution needs.

Actions Taken to Overcome the
Constraints
Delivery Corp. undertook six major initiatives to
overcome the constraints and transition to a modular
enterprise architecture.
1. Developing a Standardized Operating Model.
Delivery Corp. is transitioning from a multidivisional
model, where there was no coordination among
services, to a standardized operating model, where

the portfolio of services is being centrally defined
and interfaces standardized. In the process, the firm’s
managers are developing a shared understanding about
complementarities of services and why the lack of
standardized interfaces is inhibiting profitable growth.
2. Developing Partner Interface Processes. Delivery
Corp. is promoting the development of partner
interface processes (PIPs) for high-volume services
(see Figure 2). PIPs are self-contained process
specifications that offer a loosely coupled architecture
with standardized interfaces while enabling local
differences. In fact, PIPs are designed to make
business units agile by standardizing interfaces that
encapsulate trading partners’ core data and business
processes.

Figure 2: Partner Interface Processes
• Create a loosely coupled architecture that
enhances the interoperability of services and
business.
• Specify activities, decisions, and roles for each
partner in a B2B activity.
• Standardize interfaces and encapsulate data and
processes.
Delivery Corp. is taking steps to accelerate the
adoption of PIPs by key stakeholders, including
customers. The high-volume services targeted include
advanced shipping notification, in-transit visibility,
customs clearance, and warehouse activities. To
learn about best practices and influence the industrywide development of PIPs, Delivery Corp. is
participating in standard-setting boards for logistics
and transportation and for vertical industries, such
as the RosettaNet consortium,5 which develops
industry-wide, open business process standards for
supply chain collaboration in the high-tech industry.
By investing in and influencing the development
of PIPs, Delivery Corp. is standardizing interfaces
and reducing complexity not only among its internal
routine processes, but those of its customers too.
3. Encapsulating Business Services. Delivery
Corp. has been encapsulating services from legacy
applications by reengineering those applications using
the principles of component-based architectures.
According to the firm’s CIO, “We’re getting to
components. We have a subsystem that handles
brokerage, we have a subsystem that handles
forwarding, and we have a subsystem that handles
5
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warehousing. … What we’re now doing is taking
those core applications and putting APIs or other
data flows out of them so you can actually build a
workflow around those components.” These interfaces
are being standardized, making it easier to maintain
loose coupling among services so that they can be
combined efficiently. Such a plug-and-play capability
helps Delivery Corp. combine service offerings and be
versatile in service delivery.
4. Deploying Cross-Functional Teams. Delivery
Corp. is using cross-functional teams to improve
coordination between marketing and sales, and IT. In
the past, marketing and sales personnel sold a suite
of supply chain services (e.g., shipping, brokerage,
freight-forwarding, customs) without adequately
factoring in the IT investments that would be required
for their integration. This led to slow responsiveness
and increased costs in the delivery of solutions.
Moreover, by bringing IT personnel into the RFQ/
solutions process at the front end of a customer
engagement, the sales process is becoming more
effective at promoting the proprietary standards that
are supported by Delivery Corp. for its services.
In addition, the IT personnel who interface with
marketing and sales regularly provide IT architects
with customer feedback on the standardized interfaces
for services.
These initiatives are improving the standards and
gradually reducing the specialized learning and costs
required to interface with a customer’s proprietary
systems. According to Delivery Corp.’s CIO, “We’re
working with marketing to put some real tight
definition around our service portfolio so that our
standard offerings can encompass 85% of what we can
do.”
5. Modifying Decision Criteria for IT Investments.
Delivery Corp. is modifying the decision criteria for
IT investments projects to include how standardized
interfaces, if developed, can reduce costs and improve
the time needed to respond to customer needs in the
future. Using the modified criteria, a project that does
not appear profitable based on NPV analysis may
still be authorized if it enhances the standardization
of interfaces and creates significant options for future
growth. In addition, the decision criteria would now
recognize that a short cut with a good NPV, but which
hinders the move to a modular architecture, may
actually restrict future growth options.
6. Exploiting Best Practice Knowledge. Delivery
Corp. participates in standard-setting organizations,

such as RosettaNet and HL7 for healthcare,6 not only
to influence the evolution of public domain PIPs, but
also to be informed about best practice. In addition,
ongoing interactions with customers are a rich source
of information on best practice. This learning informs
Delivery Corp. on how to design proprietary PIPs and
leverage them for business value.
Figure 3 summarizes the constraints encountered at
Delivery Corp. in transitioning to a modular enterprise
architecture and the actions taken to address them.

CASE 2: ELECTRONICS CORP.
Like Delivery Corp., Electronics Corp. operates
in an innovative and highly competitive market.
Electronics Corp. is a U.S.-based company that
manufactures electronic components for computers
and other electronic devices. Success in this dynamic
environment depends on quick responses to customer
demands and the ability to innovate. At the time of
our initial contact with Electronics Corp., it had about
1,000 employees, and its annual sales revenue was
under $1 billion. It had a fairly flat organizational
structure with a majority of employees being
engineers and designers.
Operating in the high-tech industry, Electronics
Corp. has always been keen to deploy state-ofthe-art IT solutions. In the late 1990s, the firm’s
executives adopted ERP systems and business process
reengineering as these systems and techniques gained
prominence. Electronics Corp.’s IT department, with
the help of a major consulting firm, implemented an
ERP system to support internal business functions,
such as finance, marketing and sales, and human
resources.
During the ERP implementation, the firm underwent
a substantial process change initiative that helped
it streamline several major business processes.
The firm’s executives referred to this process as
“optimization” or “standardization” of internal
processes. Senior executives who were responsible
for product design and development processes took
initiatives to standardize new product development
and manufacturing processes. The ERP system also
forced Electronics Corp. to standardize its data
architecture.
Standardization of IT platforms and business
processes helped Electronics Corp. improve
operational efficiency and achieve the economies
6
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Figure 3: Summary of Constraints and Actions to Overcome Them at Delivery Corp.
Constraints

Actions

Non-modular Business Services

• Developing a standardized operating model to centrally define the
portfolio of business services across business units.

Incompatible Process Interfaces

• Encapsulating business services by reengineering legacy applications
using the principles of component-based architectures.
• Developing proprietary PIPs to improve integration among services
and across firm boundaries.
• Deploying cross-functional teams to improve coordination between
marketing and sales, and IT, especially with respect to promoting
standardized interfaces.

Limited Executive Knowledge of
Enterprise Architecture

• Generating shared understanding of the economic implications of PIPs
in the process of developing the standardized operating model.
• Deploying cross-functional teams to increase knowledge about
relative costs of developing customized interfaces and deploying
standards.
• Exploiting best practices learned from process standards consortia and
business partners.

Modified Decision Criteria for IT
Investments

• Modifying IT investment decision criteria to consider future benefits
from developing proprietary standards.

of scale that were essential to survive in a highly
competitive industry.7 These efforts prepared the firm
for implementing modular systems and processes.

Drivers of a Modular Enterprise
Architecture
While standardizing internal IT capabilities and
business processes helped improve operational
efficiency, top management realized that the current
IT platform and business processes were not
delivering much customer value. Firms in the highly
competitive electronics component industry need to
respond constantly to changes in the market. Further,
interorganizational relationships are very important
as businesses like Electronics Corp. depend on
other firms (i.e., trading partners) for the design and
development of key components. There are several
dominant firms in this industry that compete intensely
with each other. Non-dominant firms also face
tremendous competition in developing relationships
with dominant firms to gain market share.
Electronics Corp.’s senior executives realized that,
while internal processes had peaked in efficiency,
7 Ross and Beath note that to prepare for a modular architecture,
companies adopt disciplined business processes, often implementing
enterprise systems, such as ERP. See Ross, J. W. and Beath, C. M.
“Sustainable IT Outsourcing Success: Let Enterprise Architecture be
Your Guide,” MIS Quarterly Executive (5:4), 2006, pp. 181-192.
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strategic external processes, such as those for order
and supply chain management, were inefficient. To
their surprise, senior executives found that the firm
received customer orders via various communication
modes—website, fax, e-mail, telephone, and a
proprietary electronic data interchange (EDI) system.
Moreover, the transactions were handled through
an EDI system that was not fully integrated with the
ERP system. Data received from customers were not
compatible with the standardized data architecture that
Electronics Corp. had created. As a result, employees
had to manually enter the data into the ERP system.
Electronics Corp. executives realized that manual data
entry introduced errors in order management and other
customer-focused processes, thus increasing response
and cycle times.
Further, Electronics Corp. had to hold high inventory
levels to ensure orders were filled. Several mid-level
managers, who had more experience with trading
partners’ internal IT platforms and business processes,
noted that the firm’s IT platform and processes were
not compatible with many of its partners’ IT platforms
and business processes.
The inefficiency of interorganizational processes and
lack of responsiveness of the IT department to meet
customer demands forced top management to seek
solutions. During their quest, top management became
aware of RosettaNet. An initial assessment report by

© 2010 University of Minnesota
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Figure 4: The Two RosettaNet PIPs Initially Implemented by Electronics Corp.
PIP

Description

PIP 3A4: Request
Purchase Order

Enables a buyer to issue a purchase order and obtain an immediate response from the
supplier that acknowledges the status of the order (e.g., which purchase order product
line items are accepted, rejected, or pending).

PIP 3B2: Notifying
Advance Shipment

Allows a shipper to notify a receiver that a shipment has been assigned. This
notification contains detailed product level information about a shipment (e.g., when a
shipment is expected to arrive).

a senior executive suggested that implementation of
RosettaNet’s standardized business processes—i.e.,
partner interface processes (PIPs)—could solve many
of the problems facing the firm. Top management
decided to implement RosettaNet PIPs and integrate
them with the ERP system and internal business
processes to develop seamless interorganizational
business processes (see Appendix B for an overview
of RosettaNet PIPs8).
The vision of Electronics Corp.’s top management
when it decided to implement RosettaNet PIPs was to
be more responsive to customer and/or market needs
and to become agile. While standardizing internal
processes had optimized back-office processes,
RosettaNet PIPs offered a unique opportunity to create
a modular enterprise architecture.
RosettaNet PIPs provide a plug-and-play capability
and/or interface that enable a firm to reuse processes
across interorganizational relationships.9 Electronics
Corp. management decided initially to implement
two PIPs related to order management processes
(see Figure 4). Their implementation required
substantial changes to Electronics Corp.’s overall
order management process. Management was hoping
that these two PIPs would help the firm eliminate
redundant steps and inefficiencies from supply chain
management processes.
After the successful deployment of these two
PIPs, Electronics Corp. management decided that
four additional RosettaNet PIPs10 related to order
management processes would be deployed. Together,
these six PIPs would help the firm automate a
substantial portion of its order management value
chain. They would enable reusable process modules
8 More details on RosettaNet PIPs can be found at www.rosettanet.
org.
9 See Gosain, S., Malhotra, A., El Sawy, O. A., and Chehade, F.
“Towards Frictionless E-Business: The Impact of Common Electronic
Business Interfaces,” Communications of the ACM (46:12), 2003, pp.
186-195.
10 The four additional PIPs were PIP 3A6 (Distribute Order Status),
PIP 3A7 (Notify Purchase Order Update), PIP 3A8 (Request Purchase
Order Change), and PIP 3C3 (Notification of Invoice).
© 2010 University of Minnesota

for Electronics Corp. that would provide capabilities
for dynamic integration with trading partners.

Constraints Encountered
Electronics Corp. faced several constraints during and
after the implementation of the first two PIPs.
1. Deficient PIP Specification. Although RosettaNet
PIPs specify how organizations should exchange
business documents (that contain data) and
choreograph activities, they do not provide detailed
guidance on how to integrate these process standards
with internal IT platform and processes. Electronics
Corp.’s IT department struggled to integrate the
XML-based data formats generated by the PIPs with
the internal data architecture. Consequently, it was
difficult to process this data using the ERP system
that the firm used for much of its internal processes.
Moreover, Electronics Corp. was not able to find
any reliable middleware solutions to resolve the
integration problem.
2. Incompatible Process Interfaces. As noted earlier,
Electronics Corp. optimized and standardized its
internal business processes during the implementation
of ERP. When implementing RosettaNet PIPs, the
IT project team found that the process specifications
suggested in the PIPs were, in many cases, not
compatible with the firm’s internal processes. This
was a major setback, as the internal processes were
configured to fit with the ERP system and to provide
operational efficiency. Reconfiguring these processes
to align with RosettaNet PIPs required substantial
changes to the internal processes and ERP system.
3. Lack of IT and Business Process Expertise.
Implementing RosettaNet PIPs is complex and
resource intensive, requiring not only competent IT
specialists, but also cross-functional business process
experts. Furthermore, given that PIPs are standards
for interorganizational processes, the implementation
team needs members who have experience with
and knowledge of trading partners’ internal IT
platforms and processes. While Electronics Corp.’s
MIS Quarterly Executive Vol. 9 No. 2 / Jun 2010
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IT department was highly competent, implementing
RosettaNet PIPs was a challenge due to the rigid PIP
specifications and the need to come to grips with new
standards.
4.
Declining
Performance. Following
the
implementation of the PIPs, Electronics Corp.
management was very surprised to find that
operational efficiency decreased and cycle time
increased for transactions with the three trading
partners that used the new PIPs for placing orders.
This was a major disappointment for those who
had championed the RosettaNet project. The
implementation team blamed the lack of integration
and compatibility as the major reasons for the
performance degradation.

Actions Taken to Overcome the
Constraints
Despite the constraints, top management at
Electronics Corp. pressed forward with several
remedial actions and continued using RosettaNet
PIPs in business transactions with trading partners. To
ensure success, the implementation team took steps
to address the constraints they encountered while
implementing the initial two PIPs.
1. Formation of Cross-Functional Teams. A team
was formed with members from different business
units to support transactions that used RosettaNet
PIPs. The team ensured that customers who used
the PIPs were able to interact with the standardized
interfaces regardless of Electronics Corp.’s internal
integration and compatibility issues. The members
of the team had extensive training on RosettaNet
vocabulary and business process orchestration. If
necessary, the members manually entered the data
received from RosettaNet PIPs to the ERP system
to ensure high responsiveness and agility. A second
team was formed to identify sources of process
incompatibility and to develop long-term solutions to
address them. This team examined and documented
workflows, information flows, and data and document
requirements for each internal process to be integrated
with RosettaNet PIPs. Top management believed that
this process understanding would help Electronics
Corp. modularize more of its interorganizational
processes using standardized interfaces, which would
improve its responsiveness and agility.
2. Fault-Tolerant Assimilation. The implementation
team maintained the old processes in parallel with
RosettaNet PIPs to ensure that customer orders were
processed without delay or mistakes. This approach
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ensured the success of the modular approach
because it allowed for local differences. In effect,
employees were allowed to use traditional processes
or RosettaNet PIPs depending on the importance of an
order and a customer, which ensured loose-coupling
of standard processes. The implementation team then
decided to develop middleware that gradually took on
the role of the cross-functional RosettaNet team. The
middleware was designed to translate PIP data into a
compatible format supported by Electronics Corp.’s
standardized data architecture. Further, it developed
workflows and transported these workflows to the
ERP system so that employees responsible for an
order performed the necessary actions.
3. Exploiting Best Practices. Electronics Corp.
decided to seek implementation help from its major
trading partners that had already implemented
RosettaNet PIPs. Senior IT executives and several
managers from related business units visited
trading partners that had successfully implemented
RosettaNet PIPs. The firm also sought help from
the RosettaNet consortium for internal integration
activities. Several middle-level IT executives attended
RosettaNet training and educational workshops. The
knowledge gained by the members who visited trading
partners and attended training programs was later
documented and shared with other team members.
Exploiting this knowledge helped Electronics Corp.
develop necessary modules and associated interfaces
for back-end integration so that it did not have to
go through extensive reconfiguration of internal
processes and the ERP system.
Figure 5 summarizes the constraints encountered
by Electronics Corp. as it used RosettaNet PIPs to
transition to a modular enterprise architecture and the
actions that were taken to address them.

LESSONS LEARNED ON
TRANSITIONING TO A MODULAR
ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
Both Delivery Corp. and Electronics Corp. initially
developed their respective enterprise architecture
capabilities to optimize processes and streamline
data exchange. For both firms, this level of capability
enhanced alignment between IT and the business
within and across processes, and accelerated their
responsiveness to shifts in markets. However,
Electronics Corp. was confronted with inefficient
coordination with suppliers, while Delivery Corp.
was challenged to configure solutions efficiently for
customers from its portfolio of business services.
© 2010 University of Minnesota
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Figure 5: Summary of Constraints and Actions to Overcome Them at Electronics Corp.
Constraints

Actions

Deficient PIP Specification

• Addressed integration challenges by using best practice knowledge
from major trading partners and RosettaNet consortium.

Incompatible Process Interfaces

• Formed cross-functional teams to document internal processes and
identify sources of process incompatibility.
• Exploited best practices from major trading partners and RosettaNet
consortium to address integration challenges.

Lack of IT and Business Process
Expertise

• Used best practices developed from visiting major trading partners and
attending training and workshops run by RosettaNet consortium.

Declining Performance

• Assimilated RosettaNet PIPs in a fault tolerant fashion through the
parallel use of old processes.
• Used cross-functional teams and middleware to map PIP data into
formats compatible with internal systems.

Accordingly, each firm pursued initiatives to move
toward a modular enterprise architecture.
Based on these two case studies, we have identified
the drivers, constraints and actions taken to establish
a modular architecture, which are represented in
Figure 6. The actions and constraints span three broad
categories: business architecture, process interfaces,

and learning and negotiation. This suggests that the
constraints must be viewed holistically and should
not be narrowly perceived as a single category.
Similarly, the actions should be designed to address
the constraints across these categories.
The findings from these two cases lead to the
following five major lessons.

Figure 6: Transitioning to a Modular Enterprise Architecture
Constraints
Business Architecture
• Non-modular services (DC)

Actions
Business Architecture
• Encapsulated business services (DC)
• Standardized operating model (DC)
• Optimized back-office processes (EC)

Process Interfaces
• Incompatible interfaces (DC, EC)
• Deficient PIP specification (EC)

Process Interfaces
• Developed proprietary PIPs (DC)
• Adopted RosettaNet PIPs (EC)
• Assimilated PIPs in a fault tolerant fashion (EC)

Learning and Negotiation
• Decision criteria for IT investments (DC)
• Declining performance (EC)
• Limited expertise (DC, EC)

Learning and Negotiation
• Deployed cross-functional teams (DC, EC)
• Acquired best-practice know-how (DC, EC)
• Made long-term IT investments (DC, EC)

Drivers
• Market responsiveness (DC, EC)
• Industry standards (EC)
• Partner expectations (EC)
• Cost economies (DC)

Modular Enterprise
Architecture

DC = Found in the Delivery Corp. case
EC = Found in the Electronics Corp. case

Profitable
Growth
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Lesson 1: Optimize the Enterprise
Architecture by Implementing Business
Process Standards Where Appropriate
Delivery Corp.’s business model requires that services
offered by business units be dynamically integrated
to offer customers total solutions. It is transitioning
from hardwired linkages between applications across
business units to process standards. Accordingly,
legacy applications are being reengineered to
encapsulate services and standardize interfaces.
Electronics Corp. optimized its back-office processes,
which enabled interfaces to RosettaNet PIPs. Efforts
to provide disciplined, standard processes on a solid
IT infrastructure are critical to enabling business
modularity.11

Lesson 2: Match the Interface Approach
to Business Requirements
The cases reveal two distinct approaches to
standardizing interfaces and achieving business
modularity. Electronics Corp. deployed RosettaNet
PIPs to achieve loose coupling with suppliers and
to expand partnering options. Being a small-tomedium enterprise, this approach enabled it to focus
resources and managerial attention on evaluating
PIPs, prioritizing the ones to be initially adopted,
and assimilating them. In contrast, Delivery Corp.
established standardized interfaces among some
of its services, through negotiation among internal
stakeholders and with customers, to distinguish itself
from competitors.

Lesson 3: Understand Process
Dependencies and Negotiate
Standardized Process Interfaces
Establishing interface standards entails negotiating
global constraints among stakeholders to coordinate
local actions. In both firms, PIP standards conflicted
with established data architectures and process
configurations. Electronics Corp.’s challenge related
to the conflict between the XML specifications of
RosettaNet PIPs for order management and its data
architecture. Delivery Corp.’s challenge centered
on the tension between negotiated interfaces and

11 These findings are consistent with those reported by Ross, who
claimed companies could not move to a modular enterprise architecture
without first building a standard technology and disciplined process
platform. See Ross, J. W. “Creating a Strategic IT Architecture
Competency: Learning in Stages,” MIS Quarterly Executive (2:1),
2003, pp. 31-43; and Ross, J. W., Weill, P., and Robertson, D. C.
Enterprise Architecture as Strategy: Creating A Foundation for
Business Execution, Harvard Business School Press, 2006.
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APIs across systems in business units and customer
organizations.
Electronics Corp. applied public domain PIPs to
coordinate actions with suppliers, which required the
implementation team to become knowledgeable not
only about RosettaNet PIPs, but also about trading
partners’ internal IT platforms and processes. This
understanding enabled the team to meaningfully
negotiate data flows with partners. In the case of
Delivery Corp., proprietary PIPs were used to
integrate services across business units. These
standards had to be negotiated among business units.
In both cases, cross-functional teams helped the
companies understand process dependencies and to
negotiate interfaces that enabled loose coupling.

Lesson 4: Educate Key Stakeholders on
the Economic Benefits of Standardized
Process Interfaces
Establishing a modular enterprise architecture requires
support and commitment from senior managers,
which means they have to be well versed on the
economic implications. In the case of Delivery Corp.,
senior management was unaware of the economic
implications of standardizing the interfaces of
business services. Similarly Electronics Corp.’s
management was unaware of the business potential
of different RosettaNet PIPs in terms of coordination
with the firm’s suppliers.
To address gaps in managerial understanding,
Delivery Corp. invested significant resources to
communicate the economic value of standardizing
interfaces to its executives, especially those in
marketing and sales. Similarly, Electronics Corp.
acquired and shared knowledge about the economic
implications of RosettaNet PIPs from visiting
major trading partners and by attending training
and workshops run by the RosettaNet consortium.
Likewise, Delivery Corp. participated in standardsetting organizations for public domain PIPs and
interacted regularly with its best practice customers.

Lesson 5: Align Decision Criteria for IT
Investments with a Modular Enterprise
Architecture Strategy
Investments to develop a modular enterprise
architecture should be rationalized in terms of
capabilities for agility and profitable growth.
Consider the transition that Delivery Corp. had to
make to adjust its IT investment decision criteria.
Historically, personnel in marketing and sales focused
© 2010 University of Minnesota
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on revenue growth, not profit. As a result, they
were not concerned about the cost of implementing
process interfaces with customers and often sold them
solutions that required idiosyncratic and customized
interfaces. Now, not only are they fully conversant
with standardized interfaces, but IT personnel are
involved in front-end discussions on customer
solutions. Decisions on IT investment for a particular
solution or interface are increasingly evaluated on
potential for profitable growth, rather than just on
NPV. Similarly, Electronics Corp. examines PIP
implementation costs against the future benefits from
partnering flexibility and market responsiveness for its
major product lines.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
A modular enterprise architecture provides a platform
for profitable business growth. Transitioning to such
an architecture requires a solid base of technology
and data platforms, and processes. The transition
can be gradual, allowing a company to absorb and
build on changes resulting from each new module.
Once implemented, a modular enterprise architecture
will provide growing opportunities to deliver new

connections to partners and customers or to add new
products and services to core customer offerings.

APPENDIX A: Research
Methodology
We employed a case study methodology to understand
the drivers, constraints, and actions required to
transition to a modular enterprise architecture at
Delivery Corp. and Electronics Corp. We collected
data from multiple sources: interviews with senior
executives at the firms, discussions with executives
at customer and supplier firms, corporate documents,
press releases, and trade press articles. Our work with
Delivery Corp. began in its early years of growth
through acquisition, which has enabled us to assess
carefully the evolution of its enterprise architecture.
We interviewed Electronic Corp.’s executives over
a period of about two years and tracked various
organizational activities and events during this
time. Our data collection began during the time of
Electronic Corp.’s adoption and implementation
of RosettaNet PIPs. This helped us understand its
transition to a modular enterprise architecture.

APPENDIX B: RosettaNet Partner Interface Processes (PIPs)
RosettaNet’s mission is to develop global and open interorganizational business process
standards to enable and support seamless business-to-business integration (B2Bi). Partner
interface processes (PIPs) are the building blocks of RosettaNet standards. PIPs are organized
into seven clusters—or groups of core business processes—that represent the backbone of a
trading network: (1) partner product and service review, (2) product information, (3) order
management, (4) inventory management, (5) marketing information management, (6) service
and support, and (7) manufacturing. Below is a simplified schematic of supply chain automation
using RosettaNet PIPs.
RosettaNet PIPs in Order Management Processes
Private business process

RosettaNet PIP-enabled public business processes

Private business process

Create purchase order

PIP 3A4: Request purchase order

Receive purchase order

Receive shipping doc

PIP 3B2: Notify of Advanced Shipment

Create shipping doc

PIP 3C3: Notify of Invoice

Create invoice

Receive invoice

Buyer

Supplier

Adapted from www.rosettanet.org
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